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Note
Balancing Species Protection with Tribal Sovereignty:
What Does the Tribal Rights-Endangered Species
Order Accomplish?
Carl H. Johnson*
In a time when natural resources continue to dwindle,'
conflicting ideas over their productive use can often lead to con-
frontation and animosity.2 Disagreements over the use of natu-
* J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1994,
University of Minnesota. The author would like to thank Philip P. Frickey,
Daniel A. Farber, and Charles Stringer for support, advice, and inspiration.
This Note won Second Place in the 1997-98 American Indian Law Review
Writing Competition.
1. By the beginning of this decade, over 90% of the conifer forests in the
United States had been felled. See GEOFFREY LEAN ET AL., ATLAS OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 81 (1990). These forests contain the oldest and largest trees on
the North American continent, hosting twice as much plant material as the
most productive rainforest. Id. The current rate of wetlands destruction is
117,000 acres on average per annum. See Wetlands Status and Trends, 1985-
1995 (visited April 7, 1998) <http://www.nwf.org/wetlands/facts/statfcts.html>
(citing Fish and Wildlife Service statistics). There is currently an epidemic of
"mass biological extinction" underway, occurring at an alarming rate. Bruce
Babbitt, The Future Environmental Agenda for the United States, 64 U. COLO.
L. REV. 513, 516-17 (1993). The average total loss of wetlands varies from
state to state. Nearly one of three plant species in the United States, and one
of eight in the world, are under the threat of extinction. See William K. Ste-
vens, One in Every 8 Plant Species Is Imperiled, a Survey Finds, N.Y. TIZES,
April 9, 1998, at Al. There are currently 635 species of plants and 447 species
of animals listed as threatened or endangered, while only 124 species enjoy
designated critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act. See Endan-
gered Species General Statistics (updated May 31, 1997) <http:/lwww.fws.
gov/r9endspp/esastats.html>.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1270 (8th Cir. 1985),
rev'd in part, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) ("The plaudible [sic] purpose behind conser-
vation statutes gives rise to strong emotions."). For a comprehensive exami-
nation of the conflicts between the ideals of preserving wilderness and the
demands of economic and recreational activity in the Boundary Waters Canoe
Area Wilderness, see KEVIN PROESCHOLDT ET AL., TROUBLED WATERS: THE
FIGHT FOR THE BOUNDARY WATERS CANOE AREA WILDERNESS (1995). For a
discussion of the conflict between private property rights and mainstream en-
vironmentalism, see Tarso Ramos, Wise Use in the West: The Case of the
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ral resources are exacerbated when the sovereignty of Indian
tribes is challenged.3 Such disputes have led to discord be-
tween mainstream environmentalists and Indian tribes over
the protection of species' habitat.4
Northwest Timber Industry, in LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE: WISE USE AND THE
PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 82 (John D. Echeverria & Raymond Booth Eby
eds., 1995); see also THOMAS LAMBERT & ROBERT J. SMITH, THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: TIME FORA CHANGE 49 (1994) (stating that "individuals can stop
any development project of which they disapprove by petitioning to have some
vaguely defined group of organisms listed as endangered or threatened");
WILLIAM PERRY PENDLEY, WAR ON THE WEST: GOVERNMENT TYRANNY ON
AMERICA'S GREAT FRONTIER 88 (1995) (asserting that the "purpose of the En-
dangered Species Act has become the stopping of all activities of which envi-
ronmental extremists disapprove").
3. Indian tribes are "distinct, independent political communities, re-
taining their original natural rights" regarding self-governance. Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). Indian tribes are a "separate peo-
ple," possessing "the power of regulating their internal and social relations."
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886); see also United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (refuting a Court of Appeals decision that
was premised on the notion that Indian tribes were not sovereign entities, but
"private, voluntary organizations"). The powers of Indian tribes are generally
"inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978). These powers are in-
herent to the tribes, derived from the original self-governing sovereign powers
that Indian tribes enjoyed prior to European colonization. See McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). Without sovereignty,
tribes "have no unique standing to protect their culture, their traditions, their
unique way of life, and their political relationship with [the United States]."
All Things Considered: Native American Sovereignty (NPR radio broadcast,
Sept. 2, 1997) (statement by Ron Allen, President, National Congress of
American Indians). But see Cohen v. Little Six, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 376, 382-83
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2059 (1998) (referring to the no-
tion that tribes are sovereign as a "ridiculous pretense," and observing that
tribes cannot be sovereign because they are contained within the borders of
the United States).
Tribes see the intrusion of non-Indians into Indian Country to preserve
threatened and endangered species as invasions of tribal sovereignty. See,
e.g., Testimony of Ronnie Lupe, Chairman of the White Mountain Apache
Tribe, Prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works Subcommittee on Drinking Water, Fisheries and Wildlife (July 13,
1995) (noting that the "goals of tribal self-governance, tribal self-
determination and economic self-sufficiency [were] paralyzed by third parties
filing lawsuits ... to declare critical habitat on our reservation") (written copy
on file with the author).
4 See, e.g., Alma Soongi Beck, The Makah's Decision to Reinstate Whal-
ing: When Conservationists Clash With Native Americans Over an Ancient
Hunting Tradition, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 359, 362 (1996) (observing con-
cern of conservationists over Makah Nation's decision to reinstate gray whale
hunting, to the point of absolute opposition despite tribal reasons). Cf Robert
J. Miller, Speaking with Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties, Salmon, and the
Endangered Species Act, 70 OR. L. REV. 543, 574 (1991) (suggesting that al-
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Numerous species of plants and animals are spiritually
and culturally significant for Indian tribes.5 Several tribal
constitutions declare that the preservation of those resources is
of fundamental importance and authorize tribal councils to
protect them.6 Non-Indian-initiated litigation 7 has disrupted
tribal water rights,8 hunting and fishing rights, 9 and religious
expression.10
though the government has a responsibility to protect salmon runs, it also
should protect Indian tribes and cultures from extinction).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 659 (D. Minn.
1991) (reflecting on the spiritual significance of dreams and their relation to
the eagle in Chippewa culture); United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301,
1303 (D.N.M. 1986) (observing that the eagle is considered by the Isleta
Pueblo to be the primary messenger of the spirit world and the 'embodiment
of the overseer of life"); Dennis Martinez, First People, Firsthand Knowledge,
SIERRA, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 50 (positing that Native peoples possess thousands
of years' worth of experience and wisdom regarding the care and preservation
of the earth). Peter Wenz has proposed that indigenous peoples' views in gen-
eral are nature-friendly, making five observations to support that proposal:
(1) they lack motivation to seek increased power over nature; (2) their sense of
personal security, individuality, and sense of meaning foster environmentally
sound practices; (3) their populations are usually stable; (4) they possess a
strong land ethic; and (5) they tend to view nature as sacred. See PETER S.
WENZ, NATURE'S KEEPER 146-48 (1996). But see, e.g., Fergus M. Bordewich,
Revolution in Indian Country, AIERICAN HERITAGE, July-Aug. 1996, at 42-43
(debunking what he refers to as myths about the "white man's Indian" being
stewards of the earth).
6. See CONST. OF THE CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES OF
THE FLATHEAD RESERVATION MONTANA art. VI; CONST. OF THE MINNESOTA
CHIPPEWA TRIBE art. I, § 3; CONST. OF THE MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE OF THE
MESCALERO RESERVATION NEW MEXICO art. V, § 1(e).
7. Non-Indian individuals or entities initiate the vast majority of litiga-
tion brought against Indian tribes. This pattern greatly contributes to ani-
mosity between tribes and environmental groups. See, e.g., Silver v. Babbitt,
924 F. Supp. 976 (D. Ariz. 1995) (environmentalists challenging timber har-
vest plan initiated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Navajo Nation).
Typically when a tribe initiates litigation against another tribe, it is due to a
political struggle over which tribe represents the governing authority over a
reservation where several tribes share territory. See, e.g., Confederated
Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Lujan, 129 F.R.D. 171 (W.D. Wash.
1990). These intertribal disputes sometimes involve disputes over the alloca-
tion of limited resources. See, e.g., Muckleshoot Tribe v. Lummi Indian Tribe,
141 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1998).
8. See, e.g., Adrian N. Hansen, The Endangered Species Act and Extinc-
tion of Reserved Indian Water Rights on the San Juan River, 37 ARIZ. L. REV.
1305 (1995) (declaring that non-Indian economic development off-reservation
caused drastic reductions in native fish populations, leading to ESA action
which curtailed Indian water rights); Tim Vollmann, The Endangered Species
Act and Indian Water Rights, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1996, at 39
(referring to the ESA as the principal obstacle to Indians' exercise of their wa-
ter rights).
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In recent years, the Endangered Species Act (ESA)I" has
contributed its fair share to the quagmire of resource disputes
and infringement upon tribal rights.12 ESA litigation has
evolved into a de facto abrogation of treaty rights. 13 Recently
the Interior and Commerce Secretaries, who are charged with
administration of the ESA, signed an order (the Order)14 which
finally takes a significant step toward making sense out of an
otherwise chaotic area of federal law.15 The Order does not ad-
9. See, e.g., Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 F.3d
904 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 2295 (1998) (suit in which the
State of Minnesota sought to enjoin various bands of Chippewa from exercis-
ing fishing rights under an 1837 Treaty, despite conservation plan in effect
that would mitigate potential for overfishing).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237, 1243 (D. Or.
1996) (holding that an Indian's conviction under Bald and Golden Eagle Pro-
tection Act for possessing eagle parts did not violate his religious or privacy
rights); United States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles or Eagle Parts, 649 F.
Supp. 269, 281 (D. Nev. 1986) (holding that a conviction under Eagle Protec-
tion Act did not violate Chippewa's religious or treaty rights because Indian
was not residing on land covered in treaty with his tribe).
11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
12. See, e.g., Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm'n, Idaho,
42 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving a tribe challenging the commission's
decision to prohibit fishing for Spring Chinook Salmon after the species was
recommended for listing); United States v. Nuesca, 945 F.2d 254 (9th Cir.
1991) (upholding conviction of Native Hawaiians under ESA for fishing sea
turtles and Hawaiian monk seal); Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the Secretary of Interior
could give priority to the preservation of fish species over federal trust re-
sponsibilities to Indian tribes); Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
"(upholding the Secretary of Interior's decision to not challenge a ruling by the
International Whaling Commission that interfered with Eskimo communities'
ability to exercise subsistence exemption to hunt bowhead whales).
13. See United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(upholding the conviction of a Seminole chief under the ESA for killing a
Florida panther, and declaring that the ESA had abrogated his treaty rights,
while constructing a narrow legislative intent analysis as a basis for the deci-
sion).
14. Sec. Order No. 3206, American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal
Trust Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act (Interior and Com-
merce Departments, 1997) [hereinafter Sec. Order 3206]. While not published
in the Federal Register, the Order is available on the Internet at
<http://www.fws.gov/r9endspp/esatribe.html> (visited April 7, 1998).
15. Ranging from issues over tribal sovereign immunity to the abrogation
of treaty rights by statutes of general application, most practitioners in the
field would agree that federal Indian law is chaotic or incoherent at best. See
Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31,
33-34 (1996) [hereinafter Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law]
(asserting that "federal Indian law is a snarl of doctrinal complications," a
quality which is perhaps the "single thing most commonly known about it").
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dress whether the ESA abrogates Indian treaty rights, but
marks the potential for building trust and dialogue between
the federal government and Indian tribes. While the Order
goes far in improving relations, it falls short in providing real
legal protections.
This Note outlines the legal implications of the Order and
examines whether, under the ESA and the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA),16 the Secretaries acted within their legal
authority. This Note also proposes that the value of the Order
in its current form can best be understood by moving beyond
traditional legal analysis.17 Part I illustrates the relevant por-
tions of the ESA, the administrative authority of the Secretar-
ies under the ESA, and the interaction between the ESA and
Indian law. Part H outlines the principal language of the Or-
der. Part IlI examines the legal ramifications of the Order. It
discusses how traditional legal analysis is perhaps not very
useful in understanding the Order and sometimes counterpro-
ductive in resolving disputes in Indian law.18 This Note asserts
As an alternative to litigating Indian law issues, several authors have pro-
moted negotiation and alternative dispute resolution as a means of untangling
Indian law. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Co-
herence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754,
1757-68 (1997) [hereinafter Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents]
(outlining the shortcomings of traditional legal analysis in dealing with Indian
law issues); Janet C. Neuman, Run, River, Run: Mediation of a Water-Rights
Dispute Keeps Fish and Farmers Happy-For a Time, 67 U. COLO. L. REv.
259, 309-320 (1996) (using a case study to support the hypothesis that media-
tion is indeed a viable option for resolving complicated resource allocation
disputes, even sometimes preferable to litigation); P.S. Deloria & Robert Lau-
rence, Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The Topol-
ogy of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365, 382
(1994) (urging the creation of tribal-state negotiation entities to resolve dis-
putes over full faith and credit issues).
16. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994). Judicial review guidelines for the ESA are
outlined in 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n).
17. "Traditional legal analysis" refers to a standard model of statutory
interpretation in Indian law. This analysis considers the traditional or Indian
law canons, whether the action taken was within the delegated authority of
the interpreting agency, whether any new rights were conferred or existing
ones taken away from affected parties, whether the Order allows the taking of
a species, and whether the action is reviewable.
18. See, e.g., Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents, supra note 15, at
1757 (warning that "formal lawyerly analysis not only often fails to illuminate
the issues in federal Indian law, but can also result in deceiving conclusions").
See also George Cameron Coggins & William Modrcin, Native American Indi-
ans and Federal Wildlife Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 375, 415-19 (1979)
(suggesting that reviewing courts should shift away from the standard treaty
abrogation analysis and more towards applying an eminent domain and tak-
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that, despite recent congressional attempts to weaken the
ESA,19 the Order creates a necessary partnership with Indian
tribes that fulfills the ESA's mission of protecting threatened
and endangered species. Moreover, this Note contends that the
Order reflects recent developments in federal Indian policy 20
and the plain language of the ESA. This Note also asserts that
negotiation may produce a more useful means to build rela-
tionships between Indian tribes and federal officials. While
concluding that the Order is not legally binding, this Note lays
a foundation for permitting the Secretaries to issue an inter-
pretive order that will give this gesture the legal teeth it needs.
I. THE ESA AND INDIAN TRIBES
A. APPLICABLE FRAMEWORK OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Rolling on a wave of statutes indicating a significant shift
in national policy,21 Congress enacted the Endangered Species
Act in 1973.22 Concerned with the plight of threatened spe-
ings analysis).
19. Since the 104th Congress convened, senators and representatives
have made several attempts to modify and weaken the ESA to make it more
private-property-friendly. See discussion infra note 179 (noting several con-
gressional attempts to amend the ESA to make it more friendly to private
property owners); see also Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt, Leading
America Closer to the Promise of God's Covenant, Address at the Associated
Church Press 1996 Annual Convention (Apr. 11, 1996) (transcript available at
<http://www.doi.gov/churchpr.html> (visited April 11, 1998)) (warning that
Congress was not only "hostile to God's creation," but determined to dismantle
the legal means to protect it-the ESA).
20. See infra note 150 (illustrating recent Presidential actions which
promote a stronger government-to-government relationship between Indian
tribes and the federal government).
21. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994)); Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994)); National Marine Sanctuaries Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1061 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1401
(1994)).
22. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)). The ESA was preceded by the Endangered Spe-
cies Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275, and the En-
dangered Species Conservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926.
In his Environmental Message of February 8, 1972, President Nixon cau-
tioned that these laws "simply [did] not provide the kind of management tools
needed to act early enough to save a vanishing species." S. REP. No. 93-307,
at 3 (1973).
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cies,23 Congress enacted the ESA to create greater responsi-
bility toward the "beasts of the earth."24 The Supreme Court
touted the ESA as the "most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any na-
tion."25
The ESA makes it unlawful for any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States to "take" endangered or
threatened species.26 Given dual responsibility in interpreting
the ESA,27 the Interior and Commerce Secretaries (the Secre-
taries) must list appropriate species as endangered or threat-
ened.28 The Secretaries may consider several criteria when
listing a species.29 The ESA requires considerable collabora-
23. See S. REP. No. 93-307, at 3 (1973) (cautioning that it has "become
increasingly apparent that some sort of protective measures must be taken to
prevent the further extinction of many of the world's animal species").
24, Genesis 1:24-25. Judeo-Christian cultures traditionally have used the
biblical command by God to "subdue" the earth and "have dominion" over it
and all its creatures as justification for the consumption of the earth's natural
resources. Genesis 1:28. But see Oliver A. Houck, Reflections on the Endan-
gered Species Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 689, 698-702 (1995) (mocking the belief that
God gave the earth to man, "not to snail darters," and the underlying mythol-
ogy of our supremacy over other life on this planet). Only in recent years have
Evangelical Christians argued that because the earth is God's creation it
should be treated with respect, not abused. See, e.g., Marcia Bunge, Biblical
Views of Nature: Foundations for an Environmental Ethic, in CARE OF THE
EARTH: AN ENvIRONMENTAL REsouRcE MANUAL FOR CHURCH LEADERS 19,
19-21 (Tina B. Krause ed., 1994) (using specific passages from scripture and
philosophical approaches to promote conservationism); Babbitt, supra note 19
(transcript at 2) (reflecting on church leaders' efforts to instill in Congress a
sense of moral responsibility to protect God's creation).
25. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994). The Act defines "take" to include
"harass, harm, pursue.., wound.., or kill." 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (19). The Sec-
retary of the Interior later interpreted the word "harm" to include "significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife."
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1997). The Supreme Court upheld this interpretation of the
ESA in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687 (1995).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1533. The ESA also provides administrative authority to
the Secretary of Agriculture. See id. § 1532(15).
28. See id. § 1533(a)(1). Listing of threatened and endangered species
and their critical habitats is an administrative proceeding, subject to notice
and comment rule-making procedures. See id. § 1533(b)-(c).
29. See id. These include: "(A) the present or threatened destruction,
modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; (B) overutilization for
commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C) diseases or
predation; (D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (E) other
natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence." Id. Section
1533(b)(1) sets forth the standards to which the Secretary must adhere when
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tion between the Secretaries, 30 an arrangement that has re-
sulted in several joint orders on interpreting and administer-
ing the ESA.31
Upon determining the need to list a species, the Secretar-
ies must designate critical habitat32 for the species, using the
'best scientific data available and after taking into considera-
tion the economic impact" on the area considered. 33 The Secre-
taries may also consider the efforts of State or foreign govern-
ments to protect listed species.34 The Secretaries develop and
implement recovery plans for the conservation and survival of
threatened and endangered species in those cases where suc-
cess is most likely.35 In developing and implementing these
plans, the Secretaries may seek the assistance of private and
public agencies and organizations. 36
The ESA also outlines policies and procedures for inter-
agency and state cooperation with its administration. The Sec-
retaries may enter into agreements with any state "for the ad-
ministration and management of any area established for the
conservation of endangered species or threatened species."37
The Secretaries may also engage in cooperative agreements
with any State for implementing state conservation pro-
making determinations for listing purposes.
30. See, e.g., id. § 1533(a)(2)(C) (IT]he Secretary of the Interior may not
list or remove from any list any such species, and may not change the status
of any such species which are listed, without a prior favorable determination
made pursuant to this section by the Secretary of Commerce.").
31. See 50 C.F.R. § 424 (1997).
32. "Critical habitat" is the specific geographical area occupied by a listed
species that is "essential to the conservation of the species" and may require
special management or protection. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i). Critical habitat
may also include any areas outside of that geographical zone which the Secre-
tary may designate as necessary for the survival of the species. See id. §
1532(5)(A)(ii).
33. Id. § 1533(b)(2). Under section (a)(3), the Secretaries designate criti-
cal habitat concurrently with the listing process. See also Northern Spotted
Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 625 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (citing legislative his-
tory to support the notion that the listing process and designation of critical
habitat are to take place concurrently, subject to rare exceptions).
34. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A). These methods may include predator
control, protection of habitat, or any "other conservation practices." Id.
35. See id. § 1533(f)(1)(A). Species that are most likely to conflict with
construction, development, or other similar economic projects should be given
high priority. See id.
36. See id. § 1533(f)(2).
37. Id. § 1535(b).
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grams.3 8 For states to form cooperative agreements with agen-
cies, they must show that (1) the implementing state agency is
authorized to conserve listed species; (2) the agency has estab-
lished and provided details for an "acceptable" conservation
plan; (3) the agency is authorized to investigate and determine
what is needed to ensure the survival of listed species; (4) the
agency is authorized to acquire land to further conservation
plans; and (5) the agency has provided for public participation
in designating resident species as endangered or threatened.
39
The ESA authorizes other federal agencies to use their re-
sources to further the conservation objectives. 40 Each agency
must ensure that its actions do not "jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered.., or threatened species or result
in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat" of listed
species.41 Agencies must consult and confer with the Secretar-
ies regarding any proposed project that may adversely affect
threatened species.42
The ESA also outlines time requirements for parties to
consult with the Secretaries 43 and establish biological assess-
ments in the event a proposed project adversely affects a spe-
cies .4 The Endangered Species Committee, commonly known
as the "God Squad,"45 may grant takings exemptions to projects
despite potential adverse impact upon a listed species.46 A
38. See id. § 1535(c)(1)-(2).
39. See id. § 1535(c)(1)(A)-(E).
40. See id. § 1536(a)(1).
4L Id. § 1536(a)(2).
42. See id. § 1536(a)(3)-(4).
43. See id. § 1536(b).
44. See id. § 1536(c).
45. The term "God Squad" or "God Committee" was derived from the per-
ceived power of the committee to make decisions regarding the survival or ex-
tinction of potentially affected species. See Kathie Durbin, Industry, Agencies
Await Ruling; Some Environmentalists Say There Is No Doubt the Spotted
Owl Will Be Listed as an Endangered Species, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 28,
1990, at D1, available in 1990 WL 8397584.
46. The committee structure, guidelines, and directives are outlined in
section 7(e) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e). The "God Squad" may exempt a
proposed project from ESA prohibitions on takings when it determines, by no
less than five of its seven members, that (1) no reasonable or prudent alterna-
tives exist to the proposed action, (2) the proposed action is of significant pub-
lic interest or national or regional significance, (3) there are mitigation or en-
hancement measures in effect, and (4) the agency concerned refrained from
over-committing resources toward the project. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(5)(A)-
(D).
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takings exemption allows a project to go forward despite its
adverse impact upon a species' habitat.
The ESA is a formidable and infamous conservation
scheme.47 Property rights activists believe that the ESA unjus-
tifiably burdens private landowners,48 while ESA proponents
claim it does not go far enough in protecting endangered or
threatened species.49 Although various interested groups as-
sert that there is room for improvement,5 0 studies indicate that
species are better off with the ESA than without it.51
While environmentalists and private property advocates
have been arguing over the ESA's application to their interests,
one party has been virtually ignored in the dialogue.52 It is
47. See supra text accompanying note 25; see also STEVEN LEWIS YAFFEE,
PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
13 (1982) (asserting that the ESA was "one of the most sweeping pieces of
prohibitive policy to be enacted"); Matthew J. Rizzo, The Endangered Species
Act and Federal Agency Inaction, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 855, 855 (1994)
(suggesting that the ESA may be the "most stringent environmental law in
the United States").
48. See supra note 2 (referring to sources discussing the Wise Use move-
ment).
49. See, e.g., John F. Turner & Jason C. Rylander, Conserving Endan-
gered Species on Private Lands, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 571, 613 (1997)(arguing that the ESA is unable to keep pace with the rate of species' extinc-
tion, and merely acts as an "emergency room" for the most desperate cases);
Shauna Marie Whidden, The Hanford Reach: Protecting Columbia's Last Safe
Haven For Salmon, 26 ENvTL. L. 265, 268-69 (1996) (discussing the obstacles
to protecting Pacific Northwest salmon runs); Murray D. Feldman, Snake
River Salmon and the National Forests: The Struggle for Habitat Conserva-
tion, Resource Development, and Ecosystem Management in the Pacific
Northwest, 3 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 273, 277-78 (1996)(illustrating the extreme difficulties with protecting listed species in the face
of multiple economic and developmental interests, including commercial fish-
ing and logging).
50. See, e.g., YAFFEE, supra note 47, at 13 (arguing that there is no room
for negotiation or balancing other social goals with the ESA's preservation
objectives); Rizzo, supra note 47, at 860-69 (specifically addressing the short-
comings of Sections 4, 7, and 9 of the ESA). Environmentalists assert that the
ESA could be improved to provide further protection and more efficient listing
of endangered species, while property owners and commercial interests assert
that the ESA could be improved by lessening their share of the burden in pro-
tecting habitat.
51. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Noah by the Numbers: An Empirical
Evaluation of the Endangered Species Act, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 356, 383(1997) (relying on a variety of data to illustrate that "endangered and threat-
ened species are better off with the Act than they would be without it").
52. In virtually all of the mainstream environmental debates on the
problems with the ESA, no mention is made of its effect on Indian tribes, their
treaty rights, or their cultures. See, e.g., LAMBERT & SMITH, supra note 2, at
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTYAND THE ESA
only when Indian tribal rights directly conflict with listed spe-
cies that Indian tribes are brought into the discussion, and
rarely are their rights considered.5 3 This general failure to
consider how the ESA affects the sovereignty and cultural sur-
vival of Indian tribes has created the groundwork for ensuing
conflict.
B. EVALUATING SECRETARIAL AUTHORITY UNDER THE ESA
In enacting the ESA, Congress delegated broad adminis-
trative and interpretive authority to the Secretaries.54 The
Secretaries are subject to the judicial review provisions of the
APA55 while administering the ESA. When reviewing the deci-
sions of an agency to which broad authority has been dele-
gated, a court should be "especially reluctant" to substitute its
views for those of the agency.5 6 Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. NRDC,
Inc. 57 guides reviewing courts when they examine a specific in-
terpretive rule or action. Chevron requires a court to deter-
mine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue."53 If Congress has not spoken directly to the
issue, Chevron dictates that a reviewing court defer signifi-
cantly to the agency's interpretation of the act in question.5 9
43-53 (making six recommendations for change, none of which addresses In-
dian concerns).
53. Most environmental organizations who challenge either Bureau of In-
dian Affairs (BIA) or Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) action on Indian reser-
vation lands are so focused on species preservation that they fail to discuss
possible alternatives with the tribe before initiating litigation.
54. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1540(f) (1994).
55. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
56. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687, 708 (1995) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)).
57. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
58. Id. at 842.
59. In such a case, the only question for the reviewing court is whether
the agency's answer to the ambiguity was based on a permissible construction
of the statute. See id. at 842-45. To ascertain congressional intent, the court
must look to "the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the lan-
guage and design of the statute as a whole." K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (citing Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n. v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399,
403-05 (1988)). A court must also "employ traditional tools of statutory con-
struction, including, where appropriate, legislative history." Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1146, 1153 (1990) (citing Ohio
v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
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In the Supreme Court's first ESA decision, it brought to a
halt construction of a nearly completed dam.60 Courts have
since given Chevron-like deference to administrative actions
under the ESA.61 In the Supreme Court's most recent ESA de-
cision,62 it upheld the Secretary's definition of "harm" under
the ESA to include "significant habitat modification or degra-
dation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding,
feeding or sheltering."63
Courts have also given Chevron-style deference to the Sec-
retaries when determining whether an activity would
"significantly impair" a species' behavioral patterns. When the
Secretary of the Interior entered into a lease sale of federal
properties off the coast of Alaska for oil and gas extraction, a
citizen group brought suit under the ESA and the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)64 because the site was a
primary migratory channel for the Bowhead whale, a listed
species. 65 Distinguishing the snail darter case, 66 the court held
60. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (affirming an injunction against
the Tellico Dam project because its completion and proposed use would de-
stroy the habitat of the snail darter, a rare species of perch). The Hill case
eventually did not create as much controversy as the spotted owl cases have
because Congress later passed amendments to the ESA allowing completion of
the dam, overriding the Endangered Species Committee's denial of an exemp-
tion. See also ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 772-73 (4th ed. 1995). The spotted owl has
become the rallying symbol for those opposed to the ESA's restrictions on eco-
nomic development. For some recent spotted owl litigation, see Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995);
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992); Marbled Murrelet v.
Babbitt, 111 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1997); Oregon Natural Resources Council v.
Thomas, 92 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 1996). The 1978 amendments creating the En-
dangered Species Committee, were Congress's first indication that, despite
the plain language of the original ESA (which indicates that no economic fac-
tors may be considered in the listing process), it was unwilling to allow some
of the "lesser" species bring to a halt "important" pork-barrel projects. See
John D. Dingell, The Endangered Species Act: Legislative Perspectives on Liv-
ing Law, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF EXTINCTION 26 (Kathryn A. Kohn
ed., 1991).
61. See, e.g., Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515
U.S. at 699 (upholding Secretary of Interior's definition of "harm" to include
damage to habitat).
62. See id.
63. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1997).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370e (1994).
65. See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (1980).
66. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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that because the extraction would not completely destroy the
whales' habitat, the lease did not violate the ESA.67
Courts also defer to other federal agencies in interpreting
environmental statutes.68 An overwhelming majority of devel-
opment plans adopted or approved by agencies have continued
despite environmental challenges under the ESA.69
C. TREATY RIGHTS AND FEDERAL LAWS
From early in the colonial history of North America, In-
dian tribes were recognized as sovereign nations with which
the colonial powers could trade and develop treaties.70 For
America's first hundred years, negotiating treaties with Indian
tribes remained the standard practice.71 Treaties were consid-
ered the "supreme law of the land" regarding tribes. 72 In addi-
tion to formalizing the relationships between the tribes and the
federal government, these treaties often bestowed upon the
President broad administrative power.73 Even after the formal
treaty-making process was terminated in 1871,74 the federal
67. North Slope Borough, 642 F.2d at 607.
68. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Agric., 116 F.3d 1482
(7th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (deferring to Forest Service deci-
sions under the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994), to
adopt an Amended Land and Resource Management Plan for the Shawnee
National Forest that some environmental groups felt would adversely impact
the environment); Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1988)
(permitting the United States Forest Service to continue with paving opera-
tions that an environmental group felt would negatively impact the Yaak
River in Montana).
69. See Rachlinski, supra note 51, at 360 (observing that only eighteen
federal projects were terminated as a result of the ESA, despite the fact that
73,560 consultations were performed, and concluding that the ESA essentially
only restricts "wasteful" activities). But see PENDLEY, supra note 2, at 87
(arguing that the ESA erects "regulatory roadblocks to economic activity and
the use of private property").
70. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 42-43 (1982)
(outlining the President's administrative powers).
71. The practice of treaty-making ended in 1871. See infra note 74.
72. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
73. See COHEN, supra note 70, at 42.
74. Congress formally ended the process through the Act of Mar. 3, 1871,
ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994)). This shift in pol-
icy did not originate in the belief that Indian tribes were no longer sovereign
entities, but in institutional jealousy. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 147 (3d ed. 1983) (remarking
that the House of Representatives had long grown jealous of and dissatisfied
with the Senate's control over shaping Indian policy through its treaty power).
The House of Representatives sought to impose its will over federal Indian
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government continued to engage in treaty-like relationships
with tribes through formal "agreements" ratified by the full
Congress.75 Once the agreements were ratified, they could be
modified as could a treaty, but rights created by carrying the
agreement into effect could not be impaired.7 6
As with international treaties, Congress can abrogate In-
dian treaties at any time.77 There are, however, some limita-
tions to this perceived plenary power 8 of Congress.7 9 In gen-
eral, Indians retain exclusive hunting and fishing rights on
lands reserved to them, unless these rights were clearly relin-
quished by treaty or modified by Congress.80 These treaty
policy by cutting off funds for treaty negotiations as early as 1867. See id. at
148 (citing several statutes enacted for this purpose). Despite the termination
of the treaty process, Congress fully intended that previously-existing treaties
would remain in effect and would be honored. See COHEN, supra note 70, at v,
75. See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201 (1975)
(acknowledging that a legislated ratification of an agreement between the ex-
ecutive branch and an Indian tribe possessed the strength of a treaty and was
binding upon the states under the Supremacy Clause); COHEN supra note 70,
at 67 (illustrating that, in substance, a treaty "was an agreement between the
Federal Government and an Indian tribe").
76. See, e.g., Marlin v. Lewallen, 276 U.S. 58, 67-68 (1928).
77. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893)
(warning that Congress's clear and explicit abrogation of a treaty must be up-
held by the courts, "even in contravention of express stipulations in an earlier
treaty" with a foreign power); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566
(1903) (asserting that Congress has the power to "abrogate the provisions of
an Indian treaty," and presuming that Congress would only do so sparingly
and in the best interests of the tribes themselves and the country as a whole).
But see Miller, supra note 4, at 578-81 (1991) (arguing that Indian treaties are
international treaties which cannot legally be quietly abrogated by acts like
the ESA after those treaties have been ratified).
78. The "plenary power" of Congress has been used to justify numerous
infractions on tribal sovereignty and treaty rights, including, to name just a
few, the General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994); the In-
dian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994); the Indian Claims Act
of 1946, 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994); and the policy of Termination. Cf. Frickey,
Domesticating Federal Indian Law, supra note 15, at 35 (asserting that the
fundamental reasoning underlying the finding of congressional plenary power
over Indian affairs was an "embarrassment of logic," leading to a holding in
the Lone Wolf case, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), that was an "embarrassment of hu-
manity").
79. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) (using the Indian
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to declare that
Congress possessed broad powers to enact special legislation to "deal with the
special problems of Indians").
80. A "treaty [is] not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of right
from them-a reservation of those not granted." United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371, 381 (1905). This notion of reserved rights is referred to as the
"Reserved Rights Doctrine." See also Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,
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rights typically extend to land beyond reservation boundaries,
as most treaties allow tribes to hunt and fish in their "usual
and accustomed places."81
Another limitation is the "clear statement rule" governing
putative abrogations of treaty provisions. The Supreme Court
requires Congress to abrogate treaty rights explicitly if it
chooses to do so. 82 Congress must make an "express declara-
tion" of its intent to abrogate treaty rights.83 In the absence of
an explicit statement, courts will not construe statutes to abro-
gate treaty rights in a "backhanded way."8 4 In United States v.
Dion,85 the Supreme Court held that unless there is "clear evi-
dence that Congress actually considered the conflict between
its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on
the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the
treaty,"86 the statute will not apply.
Courts have also fashioned other interpretive canons to
address the unique nature of Indian legal issues.87 An inten-
tion to abrogate treaty rights is "not to be lightly imputed" to
576-77 (1908); COHEN, supra note 70, at 449.
81. See, e.g., Winans, 198 U.S. at 381; Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa v.
Minnesota, 124 F. 3d. 904 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 2295 (1998).
82. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 442 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) (declaring that "[aibsent explicit statu-
tory language, we have been extremely reluctant to find congressional abroga-
tion of treaty rights"); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339,
353 (1941) (noting that the Court could not find "any clear and plain indica-
tion that Congress... by creating that reservation intended to extinguish all
of the rights which the Walapais had in their ancestral home"). But see Fed-
eral Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960)
(declaring in dictum that "general Acts of Congress apply to all Indians as
well as to others in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary").
83. Leavenworth, Lawrence, & Galveston R.R. Co. v. United States, 92
U.S. 733, 741-42 (1875).
84. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968).
85. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
86. Id. at 740. This principle is commonly referred to as the Dion "actual
consideration and choice" test and is the standing law on treaty abrogation,
particularly as such abrogation applies to conservation statutes. See Tina L.
Morin, Note, Indians, Non-Indians, and the Endangered Panther; Will the In-
dian/Non-Indian Conflict Be Resolved Before the Panther Disappears?, 13
PUB. LAND L. REV. 167, 173 (1992).
87. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Re-
view of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows
Upon the Earth"--How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601 (1975)
(summarizing the traditional Indian law statutory interpretation and treaty
abrogation canons).
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Congress. 88 Courts are to construe statutes liberally in favor of
Indian tribal treaty rights.89 Any ambiguities in language are
to be interpreted in favor of Indian tribes.90
While these rules might seem to be a substantial limita-
tion on Congress's power, in practice they have not impeded
Congress's ability to modify or abolish treaties over time.91
Courts have often been willing to examine legislative history in
order to clarify uncertainties, thus softening the blow of the in-
terpretive canons. A court examining a statute may consider
the "face of the Act," the "surrounding circumstances," and
legislative history to determine congressional intent.92 Rather
than "rigidly stand by and demand a per se rule on clear statu-
tory statement," the Court will "consider clear and reliable evi-
dence in the legislative history of a statute."93
88. See Pigeon River Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160
(1934).
89. See Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
90. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397
U.S. 620, 631 (1970); Alaska Pac. Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 89. In some instances,
treaties specifically require the language to be interpreted in this manner.
See, e.g., Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 631 ("[Tlhe Treaty of Dancing Rabbit
Creek itself provides that 'in the construction of this Treaty wherever well
founded doubt shall arise, it shall be construed most favourably towards the
Choctaws.'). Courts should interpret treaty language in the manner in which
the Indian tribes would have understood the language at the time they en-
tered into the treaties. See id.; United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381
(1905); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899); United States v. Bresette, 761
F. Supp. 658, 662 (D. Minn. 1991).
91. While several entire treaties or elements of treaties have been abol-
ished or rescinded, the theft of the Black Hills of South Dakota from the Sioux
Nation is particularly illustrative. Although guaranteed to the Sioux Nation
by the Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1868, the Black Hills were later taken away
from the Sioux by Congress in 1877, a mere three years after gold was discov-
ered. See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 41 (2d. ed.
1992). In United States v. Sioux Nation, 518 F.2d 1298, 1302 (Ct. CI. 1975),
the court declared the taking of the Black Hills illegal, stating that "[a] more
ripe and rank case of dishonorable dealings will never, in all probability, be
found [in the history of our nation]."
92. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 587 (1977) (quoting
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973)); see also United States v. Fryberg,
622 F.2d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding an Indian's conviction under
the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act using congressional intent, al-
though neither the statutory language nor the legislative history expressly
abrogated his treaty rights).
93. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986).
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D. TREATYABROGATION AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Under the Dion test and its precedent, Congress must spe-
cifically address the abrogation issue in the statute.94 With the
ESA, this approach presents some difficulties. Only one provi-
sion in the ESA specifically mentions Native Americans. An
exemption in the ESA permits Alaskan Natives or non-Native
permanent residents of an Alaskan village to take a threatened
or endangered species for subsistence purposes.95 This excep-
tion, however, is inapplicable to the broader ESA treaty abro-
gation issue since Alaska Natives did not sign any treaties
with the United States. 96
The Supreme Court has never decided whether Congress
abrogated treaty rights with the ESA. In Dion, the Court spe-
cifically declined to review the issue. 97 Rather than uphold a
conviction of an Indian under the ESA for killing four bald ea-
gles, the Court based its decision on the language of the Bald
Eagle Protection Act.98 In its holding, the Court did not ad-
dress the Eighth Circuit's holding that the ESA did not abro-
94. See supra note 82 (citing cases that require Congress to expressly ab-
rogate treaties in a statute).
95. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1994). Any "Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo who is
an Alaskan Native who resides in Alaska" qualifies for the subsistence excep-
tion. Id. § 1539(e)(1)(A). "Subsistence" includes the selling of "any edible por-
tion of fish or wildlife in native villages and towns in Alaska for native con-
sumption within native villages or towns." Id. § 1539(e)(3)(i). The Act also
allows non-edible portions of species taken for subsistence purposes to be sold
in interstate commerce when made into authentic native artifacts or clothing.
See id. § 1539(e)(1)(B). In its brief report on this subsistence exception, the
Senate Commerce Committee notes that the exception is necessary not only
for sustenance but as a means of preserving social unity. See S. REP. No. 93-
307, at 5 (1973). The report further adds that takings for subsistence pur-
poses were not the principal threat to the species targeted by the Act. See id.
96. See Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 154 (Alaska 1977) ("[TIhe gov-
ernment never attempted to enter into treaties with Alaskan Natives.");
DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 911
(3d ed. 1993) ("Alaska Natives... did not enter into the special treaty rela-
tionships with the United States that had secured a unique legal and political
status for tribes in the 'lower 48.m); ef CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN
INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SPECIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 8 (1987) (referring to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1609 (1994), as a "treaty substitute").
97. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 745.
98. See 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1994). The Dion court indicated that the ESA
was a harder case to prove treaty abrogation, particularly noting that the ESA
and its legislative history were silent on the issue. See Robert Laurence, The
Abrogation of Indian Treaties by Federal Statutes Protective of the Environ-
ment, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 859, 869 (1991).
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gate treaty rights as applied to non-commercial hunting on the
reservation. Since then, only one federal court has found that
the ESA abrogates treaty rights while applying the Dion
"actual consideration and choice" test.99
H. SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3206
On June 5, 1997, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt and
Commerce Secretary William Daly signed a joint order 00 de-
signed to clarify the responsibilities of each department when
any actions taken under the ESA involve tribal trust land.101
Secretarial Order No. 3206 was based on over a year's worth of
meetings and negotiations between dozens of tribal leaders and
federal officials, including Secretary Babbitt himself.10 2 To
promote a government-to-government relationship with the
tribes, the Order acknowledges the federal trust relationship
and treaty obligations of the federal government toward Indian
tribes.10 3 The Order declares that tribes should not bear a
"disproportionate burden" for the conservation of listed species,
thus reducing the likelihood of confrontation over ESA is-
sues. 104 The Order is an internal departmental order 05 clari-
99. See United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987). For
criticism of the Billie holding and analysis, see Morin, supra note 86, at 174-
78.
100. An "order," as defined by the APA, is the whole or part of a final
agency disposition, "whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory
in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including li-
censing." 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1996). The form and purpose of the Order more
closely represents a rule, which is defined as an agency statement designed to
"implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organiza-
tion, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency." See id. §551(4). Since
there was no notice-and-comment or rule making process involved, see 5
U.S.C. § 553, the Order is not a "rule."
101. See Department of the Interior Fish and Wildlife Service, New En-
dangered Species Policy is Designed to Enhance Native American Participa-
tion, June 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 302434.
102. See Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the Fed-
eral-Tribal Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial
Order, 72 WASH. L. REv. 1063, 1067-81 (1997). The Order was modeled after
a prior negotiation between the White Mountain Apache Tribe and the Fish
and Wildlife Service. See Statement of the Relationship Between the White
Mountain Apache Tribe and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Dec. 6, 1994)
(copy on file with the author).
103. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 1.
104 Id.
105. See id. § 2(A) (indicating that the Order is for "guidance within the
Departments only"); see also id. § 1 (explaining that the Order clarifies the
responsibilities of relevant agencies within the Interior and Commerce de-
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fying policy and is not subject to the notice-and-comment pro-
cedures of the APA.106
While defining the application of federal public land laws
to the tribes, the Order reaffirms the relationship between the
federal government and Indian tribes in three ways. First, it
reiterates that the unique trust relationship between the fed-
eral government and Indian tribes has created a responsibility
obliging the federal government to exercise due care in the
management of tribal land and resources.10 7
Second, the Order recognizes the sovereignty of Indian
tribes.108 The Order reiterates that Indian tribes hold the
power to make and enforce laws and to administer justice
within their territories.10 9 In addition, tribes are free to man-
age and control Indian lands, to exercise their tribal rights,
and to protect tribal trust resources. 110 In recognizing and
evaluating a tribe's exercise of its sovereign powers, the Inte-
rior and Commerce Departments are to remain sensitive to the
many Indian cultures and religions and their associated prac-
tices and ceremonies.'
Third, the Order reaffirms the importance of tribal self-
government and self-determination.112 It recognizes that long-
partments).
106. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (a)(2) (1994). This component of the APA indicates
that matters relating to agency management do not require the rulemaking or
notice and comment procedures, which are outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 553. Under
the notice-and-comment process, an agency is required to publish a proposed
rule in the Federal Register and to provide for public comment proceedings.
Exceptions are made, however, for statements of policy or rules of agency or-
ganization. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(3)(A), (d)(2).
107. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 4.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. The essential difference between "sovereignty" and "self-
government" is subtle, but distinct. "Self-government" essentially refers to
the tribe's power to regulate and control its internal relations. "Sovereignty"
in the sense referred to in the Order relates to the tribe's power over its
"external relations," that is, involving relations between the tribe and non-
members of the tribe. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 409-10 (1989) (citing Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)); cf Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 136 (1980) (citing the Indian Financing Act
of 1974 and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975 as examples of congressional concern with fostering tribal self-
government).
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standing congressional and administrative procedures support
the fundamental rights of tribes to set their own priorities and
make decisions regarding their limited resources and their
ways of life.113 In addition, the Order requires the Depart-
ments to recognize and consider the expertise that tribes bring
to decisions regarding the disposition of natural resources.'1 4
Before identifying five fundamental principles, the Order
establishes its scope and limitations. It first clarifies that the
Order does not "grant, expand, create, or diminish" any en-
forceable rights or responsibilities.' 15 Nor does it alter or mod-
ify tribal sovereignty or in any way affect existing tribal
rights. 16 The Order ensures that the Secretaries' statutory du-
ties remain unaffected and that no grant has been given to
"take" any threatened or endangered species.117 For any de-
partmental actions already "substantially completed," the Or-
der does not impose any additional procedural requirements.'18
The Order ensures that existing agreements between the De-
partments or their agencies remain unaffected, unless mutu-
ally changed by the signatory parties.1 19 While the Order does
not apply to Alaskan Natives, it allows Native Alaskan com-
munities to implement strategies with the Departments to im-
prove the efficiency of the Order. 20
The first of the five outlined principles stresses that the
Departments, while dealing with Indian tribes on a govern-
ment-to-government basis, are to promote an ecosystem ap-
proach to critical habitat management.1 21 Agencies should
view tribal governments as having the authority and responsi-
bility for the health and welfare of ecosystems on Indian
113. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 4; see also White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (observing that "traditional
notions of Indian self government are so deeply engrained in our jurispru-
dence" that they provide an important foundation from which courts may be-
gin to address issues of sovereignty).
114, See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 4.
115. Id. § 2(B).
116. See id.
117. See id. § 2(C), (D).
118. See id. § 2(E).
119. See id. § 2(H).
120. See id. § 7. The Order directs the Departments to make recommenda-
tions to the Secretaries within one year of the effective date of the Order to
guide the administration of the ESA in Alaska in light of the government-to-
government relationship. See id
121 See id. § 5, Principle 1.
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lands. 22 Agencies are to consult with and seek participation of
Indian tribes whenever any actions planned under the ESA
may affect tribal trust lands.123 While consulting with a tribe,
agency officials may coordinate discussions with a representa-
tive selected by the affected tribe. 124 This process of coordina-
tion may also include tribal participation in data collection,
consensus seeking, and associated processes.125 Departmental
officials are expected to obtain permission from a tribe before
knowingly entering a reservation or any tribally-owned trust
land.126
The second principle of the Order clarifies the relationship
between tribal trust lands and public land laws of the United
States. In the Order, both Departments acknowledge that In-
dian lands127 are not subject to the public land laws of the
United States and are not federal public lands or part of the
public domain.128 Indian lands are set aside for the exclusive
use and benefit of the tribes, allowing them to manage the
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. Recognizing the role of consensus-seeking in the process re-
flects traditional tribal methods of decision-making, where decisions are not
made by one individual, but by consensus of the tribe. See Tracy Becker, Tra-
ditional American Indian Leadership: A Comparison with U.S. Governance 6-
7 (American Indian Research and Policy Institute, 1997) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the author).
126. See Becker, supra note 125, at 6-7. The only exceptions to this rule
are for investigative or prosecutorial law enforcement purposes, or for pur-
poses otherwise outlined in a federal-tribal agreement. Tribal officials cite
these exceptions as shortcomings in the Order. See Wilkinson, supra note
102, at 1085.
127. The Order defines Indian lands as any land held in trust by the
United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual, or land held by
any Indian tribe or individual subject to restrictions by the United States
against alienation. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 3(D). The Order
does not use the term "Indian country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994)
as "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation.., notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent... including rights-of-way running through the
reservation," any dependent Indian community within the borders of the
United States, and all Indian allotments that have not been extinguished.
Thus, the term "Indian country" provides a more expansive territory for a
tribe to exercise authority than the term "Indian lands" as defined in the Or-
der.
128. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 5, Principle 2; see also Lane v.
Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919) (stating that the plenary
power of Congress "certainly... would not justify... treating the lands of
these... Indians as public lands of the United States, and disposing of the
same under the Public Land Laws").
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lands in accordance with tribal goals and objectives within the
bounds of existing laws.1 29
The third principle directs affected departments and agen-
cies to limit unnecessary conservation restrictions on Indian
tribes and to assist tribes in promoting healthy ecosystems. 130
Agencies should offer scientific and technical assistance as
necessary to foster the dual goals of Indian self-government
and healthy ecosystem management.131 Departments must
also respect and recognize the exercise of tribal sovereignty
over the management of tribal lands and tribal trust re-
sources. 32 In particular, departments should defer to tribal
conservation and management plans for tribal trust resources
that govern activities on Indian lands, including tribally-owned
fee lands, 133 and address the conservation needs of listed spe-
cies. 134 Whenever a federal conservation measure is being con-
sidered for any species on Indian land, departments and agen-
cies should consult with the affected tribes and assist them in
developing conservation plans of their own.1 35
Noting that it is preferable to avoid interference with
tribal self-government, the Order directs departments to con-
sult with tribes when any tribal activities might raise the po-
tential issue of a direct take136 under the ESA.137 This consulta-
tion is to be accompanied by written notice to the tribes of any
intended restrictions as far in advance as possible in order to
129. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 5, Principle 2.
130. See id. at Principle 3.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. The Order refers to "tribally-owned fee lands" in addition to the terri-
tories covered under the definition of "Indian lands." The term "tribally-
owned" would most likely include lands that the tribe or its members pur-
chased pursuant to the allotment process or those lands formerly owned in fee
by non-Indians and later purchased by the tribe. See generally D. S. OTIS,
THE DAwEs AcT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (Francis Paul Prucha
ed., 1973) (discussing the Allotment Act, its policy motivations, and its impact
on tribal communities).
134. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 5, Principle 3.
135. See id.
136. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994) (defining "take" to include "harm, pur-
sue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect"). A direct take, there-
fore, involves actual physical injury to the protected species. See, e.g., South-
west Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Bureau of Reclamation,
143 F.3d 515, 517 (9th Cir. 1998); Pacific Northwest Generating Coop. v. Alu-
minum Co. of America, 822 F. Supp. 1479, 1498 (D. Or. 1993).
137. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 5, Principle 3(C).
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foster cooperative arrangements. 38 The consultation should
strive to "harmonize" any potential conflicts between the prin-
ciples of tribal self-government, the federal trust responsibility,
and the departmental responsibilities under the ESA.
139
In cases that may involve an incidental take140 under the
ESA, notice shall include an analysis and determination that
five conservation standards have been met: (1) the restriction
proposed is reasonable and necessary for the conservation of
the species; (2) the conservation purpose of the restriction can-
not be achieved through reasonable regulation of non-Indian
activities; (3) the measure is the least restrictive means avail-
able to achieve the conservation goals; (4) the restriction does
not in any way discriminate against Indian activities; and (5)
voluntary tribal measures, such as habitat management plans,
are inadequate to achieve the stated conservation goals.
1 41
The two remaining principles further promote respect and
the protection of information shared between tribes and the
Departments. Departments are to consider the impact of
agency actions and ESA policy upon Indian cultural and spiri-
tual uses of listed species.142 In attempting to minimize or
avoid interference with noncommercial uses'43 of listed sacred
plants and animals, departments may issue guidelines that ac-
commodate Indian access to and traditional uses of those
plants and animals. 144
138. See id.
139. Id
140. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or.,
515 U.S. 687, 707 (1995) (using the House Committee reports on the 1982
ESA amendments as support for a definition of "incidental" takings to include
harm to habitat: "By use of the word 'incidental' the Committee intends to
cover situations in which it is known that a taking will occur if the other ac-
tivity is engaged in but such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of,
the activity." H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 31 (1982)). For cases discussing the
incidental take of protected species, see Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council,
148 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170
(9th Cir. 1998); National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
141. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 5, Principle 3(C).
142. See id at Principle 4.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1262 (8th Cir. 1985),
rev'd in part, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (limiting its holding to noncommercial uses);
United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 662-64 (D. Minn. 1991) (affrming
Indian's treaty right to sell migratory bird feathers because the migratory
Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1994), did not abrogate that right).
144. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 5, Principle 4.
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Consistent with provisions of the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA)145 and the Privacy Act,146 departments are to make
available to Indian tribes all information related to Indian
lands and tribal trust resources. 147 During this mutual ex-
change of information, departments are to protect tribal infor-
mation that has been disclosed to departmental officials.1 48
Departments are encouraged to notify Indian tribes of requests
for tribal information related to the administration of the
ESA149
In addition to interacting in a government-to-government 50
relationship and sharing information, Indian tribes may en-
145. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
146. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994)
147. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 5, Principle 5.
148. See id. Tribal information should be protected to "the maximum ex-
tent practicable." Id.
149. See id.
150. Principles of a government-to-government relationship between In-
dian tribes and the federal government are not foreign to federal Indian policy
and have experienced a long yet inconsistent history. For over a century,
building this relationship involved treaty-making and establishing agree-
ments. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. In the last few dec-
ades, however, executive pronouncements have outlined this relationship. In
1970, President Richard Nixon informed Congress that he intended to signifi-
cantly alter federal Indian policy to strengthen tribal sovereignty, transfer
control of programs from federal to tribal governments, protect Indian land
resources, and put an end to the policy of involuntary termination. See
CLINTON ET AL., supra note 74, at 160. This pronouncement represented the
"single strongest statement to date by the federal government supporting the
strengthening of tribal sovereignty and control while advocating protection of
[Indian resources]." Id.
President Bill Clinton issued a Memorandum reasserting this relation-
ship. See Government-to-Government Relations With Native American Tribal
Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (April 29, 1994). The purpose of the
Memorandum was to "ensure that the Federal Government operates within a
government-to-government relationship with federally recognized Native
American tribes." Id. The Memorandum directed executive departments to
consult with tribal governments prior to taking any action that might affect
federally recognized tribal governance. See id. More specifically, the Memo-
randum directed federal agencies to apply the requirements of Executive Or-
ders 12875 (Enhancing the Intergovernmental Partnership) and 12866(Regulatory Planning and Review) to create solutions and tailor federal pro-
grams to address the "specific or unique needs of tribal communities," and
clarified that its intent was to improve internal management of the executive
branch and not to create any rights to administrative or judicial review. 59
Fed. Reg. at 22,951.
The value of this ongoing government-to-government relationship is im-
measurable. Because tribes are not actually states, they are not represented
in the United States Congress. There are no seats in the House or the Senate
for the Navajo Nation, but there are seats for the State of Arizona. While
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gage in more formalized cooperative agreements. 151 These in-
tergovernmental agreements may be pursued to solidify
agreements involving sensitive species. 152 Such agreements
may include land and resource management schemes, multi-
jurisdictional partnerships, cooperative law enforcement, and
other guidelines designed to facilitate Indian access to and use
of natural products153
HI. BALANCING THE GOALS OF ECOSYSTEM
PROTECTION WITH THE REALITY OF TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY
The purpose of this Note is to examine whether this Order
on the sovereign-to-sovereign relationship between the federal
government and recognized Indian tribes154 is in harmony with
the ESA. Examination of an agency action must always begin
with the plain language of the applicable statute.155 However,
with federal Indian law, this examination must be conducted
while considering treaties, 156 tripartite federalism, 57 and the
tribal members as individual American citizens are in theory represented by
the duly elected officials from their state, they are not represented at the na-
tional level as tribal members. This lack of tribal representation is evident
from historical and recent congressional assaults on tribal sovereignty.
15L See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 6.
152. "Sensitive species" include candidate, proposed, and listed species.
See id.
153. See id.
154. See id. § 3(A).
155. If the statutory language is plain and clear, that language is ordinar-
ily regarded as conclusive. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S.
564, 570 (1982).
156. It is impossible to construct an analytical model that applies fairly to
all U.S.-Indian treaties. While there are 555 federally recognized Indian
tribes, see Questions & Answers-American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-
Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act (visited April 7,
1998) <http://www.fws.gov/r9endspp/esatrqa.html>, not all of those tribes
share a treaty with the United States. See sources cited infra note 159
(noting that Alaskan Natives are not the same as Indian tribes and do not
share a treaty relationship with the United States). Some tribes, such as the
Katka, only share one treaty with the United States, while others, such as the
Chippewa, share as many as thirty. See generally 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS,
AND TREATIES (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904). In addition, not all treaties are
alike. Most treaties share common elements (such as ceding land, establish-
ing reservations, maintaining hunting and fishing rights, and establishing
educational systems). See id. Others address specific concerns between the
tribe and the United States. For example, the Treaty with the Apache, signed
in 1853, contains several provisions that reflect the militarily confrontational
history between that Tribe and the U.S. Army. These components call for
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federal trust responsibility to Indian tribes.1 58 Aside from the
unique relationships created in treaties, not all native commu-
nities are alike. Indian tribes in the lower forty-eight differ
from Alaskan Natives, and Alaskan Natives differ from Ha-
waiian Natives. 59 Finally, a legal analysis in Indian law must
consider the traditional Indian statute and treaty canons.1 60
guarantees from the Apache to neither encourage nor engage in hostilities
with the United States, and establish a military post on the reservation. See
Treaty With the Apache, Mar. 25 1853, U.S.-Apache, art. 2, 8, 10 Stat. 979.
157. In contrast to common perceptions of federalism, there are three sets
of governmental entities in the United States: the federal government, state
governments, and tribal governments. See, e.g., Greg Overstreet, Re-
empowering the Native American: A Conservative Proposal to Restore Tribal
Sovereignty and Self-Reliance to Federal Indian Policy, 14 HANLINE J. PUB. L.
& POLY 1, 29 (1993) (indicating that tribes could represent an invaluable
check on the powers of the federal and state governments); Mark Savage, Na-
tive Americans and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 16 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 57, 60 (1991) ("Ours is not a federal system comprising only
state and national governments, but a tripartite order. Native American
tribes constitute a unique, third category within our federal system."); Robert
N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLIAMETE L. REV.
841, 873 (1989) (indicating that while tribes fit better into a transnational
model than one centering around federalism, they have in practice been in-
corporated into the federal union); cf Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and
Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian
Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 408 (1993) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution
performs the same function between states and the federal government as do
treaties between tribes and the federal government). With the advent of Pub-
lic Law 280, civil and criminal jurisdiction in Indian country can be split up
between state, federal, and tribal jurisdiction.
158. Not following a traditional trust model, the federal trust relationship
with Indian tribes dates back to Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1(1831), where Chief Justice Marshall described the relationship between those
two governmental entities as "resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian."
Id. at 17. The application of this trust relationship "suggests an affirmative
federal duty, especially by the Department of the Interior, to protect Indian
trust property from injury by other federal projects... unless ... Congress
had... specifically authorized the injury" and compensated the tribe for the
injury. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 74;, at 236. Most litigation surrounding
management of tribal resources involves a claim against the federal govern-
ment for mismanagement of those resources. See, e.g., United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935) (affirming a monetary damages award to Tribe for
the taking of lands, applying a trust responsibility model); Oglala Sioux Tribe
v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 176 (1990) (holding that federal government's
authority and control over tribal resources was sufficient to create trust re-
sponsibility and establish fiduciary responsibility).
159. See United States v. Nuesca, 945 F.2d 254, 257 (9th Cir. 1991)(drawing legal and cultural distinctions between Hawaiian Natives and Alas-
kan Natives); see also Miller, supra note 4, at 568 (observing that Alaskan Na-
tives are not necessarily Indians); Sally J. Johnson, Honoring Treaty Rights
and Conserving Endangered Species after United States v. Dion, 13 PUB.
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A. APPROACHING THE ORDER FROM A TRADITIONAL
STANDPOINT
On the surface, it would seem that the Order does not ac-
tually accomplish anything legally binding. But digging below
the surface, one finds that the Order, if implemented properly,
accomplishes two very important tasks: it lays the foundation
for the Secretaries to issue an interpretive order, and it offers a
model for negotiation and dialogue between federal agencies
and Indian tribes. Before exploring that second possibility, let
us examine the Order through standard legal analysis. To be-
gin that process, I will highlight its fundamental failings.
First, the Order does not resolve the ESA-treaty abroga-
tion issue in a concrete form. While creating a format through
which Indian tribes may have more authority in exercising
their rights, it merely states matters of policy that are long on
platitudes but short on solutions. Unlike Secretary Babbitt's
interpretation and expansion of the meaning of "harm" under
the ESA,161 the Order is not an interpretive ruling. As a result,
it will not enjoy the Chevron deference that interpretive orders
enjoy. 62 The Order also fails to address directly the Supreme
LAND L. REV. 179, 186 & nn.71-75 (noting that, unlike Indian tribes protected
by treaty, Alaskan Natives are protected primarily by statutes); cf. Morin, su-
pra note 86, at 174-78 (discussing the Billie court's analogizing of Alaskan Na-
tives to Indian tribes as one of the fundamental flaws in the decision).
160. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986) (clarifying that
the rule requiring that Congress explicitly declare its intent to abrogate treaty
rights is not a per se rule); Laurence, supra note 98, at 862 (1991) (assuring
that the Indian canons are less than "Indians always win" guidelines); see also
supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text (summarizing the canons that guide
treaty interpretation).
161. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (highlighting the interpre-
tive order which expands the meaning of "harm7 to include habitat modifica-
tion or destruction).
162. Chevron only applies to interpretive rules or actions. Under the
Chevron doctrine, the reviewing court conducts a two-step process: (1) Deter-
mine if Congress has spoken precisely to the question at issue; (2) if Congress
has not spoken directly, a court may defer to the agency's determination if the
agency interpretation was not unreasonable. A court may conduct its own re-
view of congressional intent by looking at the language of the statute and its
design as a whole, and in doing so, may employ the traditional canons of con-
struction. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. Under the APA, an
agency action can only be overturned by the reviewing court if it is arbitrary
and capricious or in excess of statutory authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (A),
(C) (1994).
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Court's ruling in Dion and its implications for treaty rights un-
der the ESA.163
In addition, the Order fails to establish firmly what sort of
procedures tribes and federal agencies will need to follow in
order to apply its language to future ESA confrontations. The
Order does not specify what level of control tribes will exercise
in managing their critical habitat. Nor does it provide a solid
mechanism for tribes to obtain redress in the event that federal
agencies fail to carry out their instructions. The Order does
not bind the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine
Fisheries Service to act in the best interests of tribes; instead,
it merely provides a guide for agency behavior toward tribes.
The Order also fails to establish how the government-to-
government relationship will be implemented. 64 Essentially,
the Order leaves tribes subject to the good graces of the ad-ministering agency. The ESA in its current form contains no
provision under which tribes can sue; and pursuing litigation
via the trust doctrine would most likely be unsuccessful. It
would be difficult for a tribe to argue that the government was
failing in its trust capacity by prohibiting tribes from pursuing
resource development and managing their own critical habitat
on tribal lands.
Conversely, federal agencies have no substantial authority
on which to fall back in the event that environmental groups
seek to use the ESA to enjoin a tribal habitat management
plan. While groups may not enjoin a general statement of pol-
icy,165 they can enjoin its implementation. 66
163. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Dion
holding and the subsequent Billie decision, which applied the Dion stan-
dards).
164. Those who have practiced in Indian Country are repeatedly faced
with federal officials who are not at all familiar with guiding policy directives
such as President Clinton's Memorandum on the government-to-government
relationship, see supra note 150. Interview with Charles Stringer, former at-
torney with the White Mountain Apache Tribe, in Minneapolis, Minn. (March
19, 1998). Absent any knowledge of guiding federal policy, it is inherently dif-
ficult for tribes to engage in a government-to-government relationship with
federal officials who do not know that such a relationship with Indian tribes
even exists.
165. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)(noting that parties must have an actual injury to bring suit under the ESA
and cannot merely allege some general grievance against a federal agency and
its guiding policy).
166. Under both the ESA and the APA, environmental groups can chal-
lenge any agency action that could result in an unauthorized taking of a listed
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Finally, the Order fails to address the problem of ESA non-
compliance by non-Indian neighbors. There is a growing
movement of private property owners who fiercely despise the
ESA and its restrictions upon their liberties.1 67 If the Order
truly grants special privileges to Indians over non-Indians, as
Senator Gorton suggests, 168 then it could possibly exacerbate
the ill will that property rights activists feel towards the fed-
eral government in its administration of the ESA. Given this
opposition, the Order may contribute to more fear and animos-
ity toward Indian tribes.
The fears and warnings issued by opponents to the Order
are quite simply unfounded, resembling more the ramblings of
Chicken Little about the falling sky than any real danger about
tribal abuses and racial discrimination. The Order does not
permit tribes to hunt or fish an animal to extinction. 169 It does
not permit tribes to "take" a species without complying with
the standards already established in the ESA.170 It does not
allow Indian tribes to control the activities of non-Indians on
species. Any implementation of a cooperative agreement between tribal and
federal officials over a habitat management plan would likely constitute an
"action." If environmental groups felt that such a plan violated the ESA,
there would be no legal support to stop them from suing the federal agency.
167. See supra note 2 (discussing the perceived burden the ESA places
upon private property owners and the animosity that the ESA generates).
168. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (recording remarks made
by the Senator during an appropriations bill hearing). Senator Gorton's con-
cerns about racial discrimination expressed in this report are only a small
part of his ongoing quest to eliminate tribal sovereignty and destroy any
authority of tribal governments to protect their people and their lands. See,
e.g., American Indian Equal Justice Act, S. 1691, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998)
(proposing to eliminate tribal sovereign immunity and allow states to tax
tribes). Ironically, this bill was introduced on the 25th anniversary of the first
day of the American Indian Movement's occupation of Wounded Knee
(February 27, 1973). See also Timothy Egan, Backlash Growing as Indians
Make a Stand for Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 1998, at A16 (noting that
Senator Gorton has "clashed with tribes" for three decades and is known to be
openly hostile to tribal interests).
169. Tribes have considerable reasons to protect their resources despite
Justice Douglas's dictum in Puyallup Tribe v. Washington, 414 U.S. 44, 49
(1973), which states that treaty rights to fish do not extend "down to the very
last steelhead in the river." The Eighth Circuit recognized the fallacy of rely-
ing upon this language to extinguish treaty rights. See United States v. Dion,
752 F.2d 1261, 1270 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). The
court noted that the Puyallup dicta referred to "in-common" rights, not exclu-
sive rights. Id. The court also noted that, in the Dion case, the government
had not established that the bald eagle would become extinct if the Indians
exercised their treaty rights. See id.
170. Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 2(D).
1998]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
fee land,171 nor does it grant a special privilege based on race
over those non-Indian neighbors. 7 2 Finally, the Order does not
allow unchecked economic development to destroy critical habi-
tat.173 Given these protections, opponents of the Order have no
reason to fear it.
In order for the Interior and Commerce Departments to
remedy these failings and to truly accomplish what the Order
envisions, an interpretive order must be issued. The interpre-
tive order should read as follows: "Under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, the term 'State' includes Indian tribes for the purpose
of critical habitat management." Bolstered by a formal inter-
pretive order, the Order would have binding authority and en-
joy Chevron deference. The following analysis sets forth the
legal foundation upon which the Secretaries might stand if
they issued such an order.
1. The Plain Language of the ESA Would Permit Tribes To Be
Treated as States: A Closer Look at the ESA, Treaty Rights,
and Tribal Habitat Management
When analyzing legislative intent, the essential starting
point is the plain language of the text.174 Particularly, when
171. See id. § 3(D); id. § 5, Principle 3(B). The Order limits its application
to Indian lands (trust or held in fee), excluding non-Indian lands within the
reservation. But see infra note 184 (listing several environmental regulatory
statutes in which Congress has permitted Indian tribes to exercise civil
authority over non-Indians within reservation borders).
172. See S. REP. No. 105-56, at 24 (1997). Commenting on the Order,
Senator Gorton expressed his fear that the departments would grant some
sort of "preferential treatment" to tribes when designating critical habitat.
He asserted that nothing in the ESA allows Indian lands to be treated any dif-
ferently than non-Indian lands. Senator Gorton misses the point, though: the
Order does not treat Indian lands differently, but treats Indian tribal gov-
ernments differently than private citizens. Cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 550-54 (1974) (holding that benefits to tribal members in BIA hiring
practices did not reflect racial preferences but a political relationship).
173. Tribes remain subject to the supervision and administrative authority
of the Interior and Commerce Departments. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note
14, §§ 1-2(B), (C), (D); see also Questions & Answers-American Indian Tribal
Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species
Act, No. 11 ( visited April 7, 1998) <http://www.fws.gov/r9endspp/esatrqa.
html> (reaffirming that the Order neither grants special rights nor super-
sedes the Secretaries' statutory duties).
174. A well known axiom of interpretation tells us that "[although] we may
not end with the words in construing a disputed statute, one certainly begins
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conducting a Chevron analysis, one must first examine
whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue at hand.17 5
Only one section of the ESA specifically addresses native con-
cerns. It permits Alaskan Natives to hunt and fish listed spe-
cies for subsistence purposes.176 A strict textualist would read
that language and conclude that the ESA only permitted Alas-
kan Natives to hunt and fish listed species, thereby ignoring
the treaty rights of Indian tribes.1 77 To so conclude would ig-
nore over one hundred and sixty years of jurisprudence and
would violate the most basic principles of federal Indian law.178
Congress has not abrogated Indian treaty rights through
the ESA, despite numerous opportunities 79 and suggestions 80
to do so. Most recently, Congress has been more concerned
there." FELIX FRANKFURTER, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE READING OF
STATUTES 16 (1947).
175. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
176. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1994). See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying
text (discussing the language and statutory history of the Alaskan Native
subsistence exception).
177. The incorrect application of the textualist approach, that is, failing to
understand the distinctions between Native Alaskans and Indian tribes, was
the result in the Billie decision. See United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp.
1485, 1490-92 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
178. The Supreme Court, however, is increasingly destroying or radically
changing the most common principles of federal Indian law. See infra note
203 (commenting on three unanimous decisions issued by the Supreme Court
in the last year that defy long-held standards of Indian law).
179. The ESA is continually up for reauthorization, but rarely do members
of Congress propose amendments dealing with the Indian issue. More
amendments are designed to alleviate conflicts with the ESA and industry or
private landowners. See Miller, supra note 4, at 576; see also Tanya L. God-
frey, The Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act: A Hotly Contested
Debate, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 979, 1013-16 (1996) (discussing various proposed
amendments addressing private property rights concerns); J. B. Ruhl, Section
7(A)(1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining
the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL.
L. 1107, 1153-60 (1995) (addressing several House and Senate proposed ESA
amendments in the 104th Congress); Donald J. Barry, Amending the Endan-
gered Species Act, the Ransom of Red Chief and Other Related Topics, 21
ENVTL. L. 587, 589-94 (1991) (discussing various amendments and the overall
difficulty of amending the ESA).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1268 n.14 (8th Cir.
1985), rev'd in part, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (stating that in order to resolve the
dispute between the ESA and Indian treaty rights, "Congress may... act if it
chooses to do so"); Laurence, supra note 98, at 881 (reflecting on evidence in
the legislative history that the 92nd Congress had been warned that, without
a treaty abrogation clause, Indian treaty rights would survive). Nothing in
the legislative history for the ESA suggests that the 93rd Congress considered
the question of treaty abrogation.
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with providing relief to private property owners than with In-
dian concerns. 81 Given the complexity and diversity of Indian
tribes and the treaties that forge their relationships with the
federal government, it is most likely preferable to Indian inter-
ests that Congress has not amended the ESA to address treaty
rights. A single enactment would be inadequate to address the
concerns of over five hundred distinct and unique communities.
In fact, such action might be disastrous because of the diverse
and unique needs of each tribe. What might benefit one tribe
could seriously impair the opportunities for another. Further-
more, aside from the treaty rights issue, Congress has also not
spoken to the issue of treating tribes as states under the ESA.
Rather than a new enactment, therefore, what tribal communi-
ties need is the flexibility to work within the existing ESA to
forge agreements and develop habitat management practices
that address their unique needs.
The second step in the Chevron analysis is to determine
whether an agency interpretation was a permissible construc-
tion of the statute.18 2 A sufficient legal foundation exists to
support an interpretive order giving habitat management
authority to tribes. Although not specifically named in the
ESA, Indian tribes and tribal communities could be included in
several statutory provisions that allow state or other govern-
mental entities to cooperate in administering the ESA.183
Though tribes are not equal to states as a general rule, Con-
gress has treated tribes as states for the purpose of assisting in
administering environmental regulations18 4 Though chal-
181. The vast majority of discussions in Congress regarding ways to im-
prove the ESA revolve around improving the listing process, allowing more
opportunities for incidental takings, and easing the burden on private prop-
erty owners and economic development. See supra note 179.
182. See supra note 59.
183. The ESA outlines procedures and policies for state cooperation in its
administration. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
184. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k)
(1994); Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (West Supp.
1998); Superfund Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9626(a) (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, id.
§ 300j-11(a) (1994). See generally Teresa A. Williams, Pollution and Hazard-
ous Waste on Indian Lands: Do Federal Laws Apply and Who May Enforce
Them?, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 269 (1992) (providing further analysis of these
provisions and their application). An amendment was introduced in the cur-
rent congressional session that would formally include tribes in ESA provi-
sions related to recovery efforts and cooperative agreements. See H.R. 2351,
105th Cong. (1998).
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lenged in the courts, these treatment-as-state provisions have
been upheld if they followed statutory guidelines.18 5
An agency interpretation allowing tribes to behave simi-
larly to states in managing critical habitat under the ESA
would not be impermissible. Agencies are given wide discre-
tion to fill in statutory gaps, so long as the promulgated rules
are a "permissible construction of the statute."18 6 In assigning
full administrative authority to the Interior and Commerce
Departments, the ESA language plainly suggests that those
Departments should be allowed to seek assistance in adminis-
tering the act from other governmental entities.187 The Act
specifically authorizes the Secretaries to "utilize their authori-
ties in the furtherance of' the ESA and its goals of conserva-
tion.188 The Order has taken the logical step of applying this
language to Indian tribes to assist in the daunting task of con-
serving threatened and endangered species. 8 9
The language of the Order suggests that Indian tribes are
to follow the same procedures and requirements as States in
managing critical habitat.190 The only difference in the ar-
185. See, e.g., Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (1996) (defeating
challenge to EPA's recognition of the Pueblo of Isleta as a state for the pur-
poses of administering the Clean Water Act); Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp.
945 (1996), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3783 (U.S. May 29, 1998) (No.
97-1929) (upholding EPA's granting of treatment-as-state designation to the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes under the Clean Water Act).
186. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
187. The ESA permits the Secretaries to collaborate with States, foreign
governments, federal agencies, and private entities in protecting threatened
and endangered species. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text. In
addition, the FWS and National Fisheries and Marine Service (NMFS) have
recently increased efforts to incorporate private landowners into the
"partnership" of species protection. See Ruhl, supra note 179, at 1144.
188. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (1994).
189. The Secretaries possess the discretion to make responsible decisions
as they balance the public and social concerns involved in administering the
ESA. See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Insufficient budget and personnel inhibits responsible agencies from carrying
out their statutory duties and administering the ESA in a timely manner. See
Rudy Abramson, Wildlife Act: Sword or Shield?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at
Al. From 1980 to 1990, the inspector general of the Interior Department
designated 34 species as extinct but failed to take steps to protect them. See
id.; see also Rachlinski, supra note 51, at 364 (stating that the FWS does not
have the necessary funds to implement recovery efforts for the numerous spe-
cies awaiting listing).
190. The ESA authorizes the Secretaries to engage in cooperative agree-
ments with states that establish and maintain adequate and active programs
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rangement between tribes and the Departments compared
with that between the States and the Departments is the lan-
guage regarding the sharing of information. 191 This informa-
tion protection, however, does not give tribes more freedom to
violate the act, but merely reflects a desire to respect tribal
sovereignty as long as tribal activities do not violate the Act.192
Existing statutory language would ensure that tribes do not
violate the ESA while managing critical habitat. If agencies
were to apply the language requiring periodic review of state
programs to the tribes, this would ensure that tribes maintain
successful and compliant programs. 193 Given the language and
purpose of the ESA and the deference given to the Secretaries
when interpreting the Act,194 the Order's creation of coopera-
tive agreements and relationships with Indian tribes was a
permissible act of delegated authority.
for the conservation of endangered and threatened species, provided those
states meet certain criteria. For selected criteria, see supra text accompany-
ing note 39. Section 5, Principle 3 of the Order outlines the types of ecosys-
tem management programs that affected departments should assist tribes in
formulating. Although deferring significantly to tribes in managing critical
habitat on tribal trust land, the Order does not preclude the Secretaries from
interceding if tribal management plans violate the conservation goals of the
ESA. Similar to the way in which States are treated under the ESA, tribes
are free to manage critical habitat subject to the approval of the Secretaries
as long as those management practices do not violate the Act.
191. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 5, Principle 5. This portion of
the Order guides agencies to protect any information that tribes have dis-
closed to agency officials. No provision in the ESA provides such protection to
the exchange of information between states and the federal government.
192. Cf New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 337 (1983)(suggesting that the Mescalero Apache Tribe could exercise substantial con-
trol over its land resources on the reservation as long as its conservation
standards met statutory requirements, citing Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981), as support for a general proposition that such a standard
could apply to all tribes). Tribal governments are as capable as states or fed-
eral agencies in conserving and regulating scarce resources. See Miller, supra
note 4, at 581-82.
193. See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(e). This subsection requires annual review by
the Secretary, subject to comment from interested persons. Such review,
however, would be subject to tribal permission for federal officials to enter the
reservation and to the agreement regarding sharing of information as outlined
in the Order. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 5, Principles 1 & 5.
194. See supra Part L.A-B.
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2. Fulfilling the ESA's Purpose of Ecosystem Management
and Protection While Reflecting Tribal Needs to Protect
Resources
In providing Indian tribes more autonomy in managing
critical habitat on Indian lands, the Order furthers the purpose
of ecosystem protection and reflects tribal motivations to pre-
serve fragile ecosystems. 195 Congress intended for the ESA to
consider ecosystems and the threatened or endangered species
that depend on them.196 Recently the focus on single species
protection has shifted more towards promoting healthy biodi-
versity and ecosystem protection as a matter of law and sound
science. 197
Congress intended the ESA to address the two primary
causes of species extinction: destruction of natural habitat and
hunting.198 For example, commercial logging operations ignore
the impact on ecosystems and contribute greatly to habitat de-
struction.199 The vast majority of commercial logging, though,
is conducted on private land pursuant to timber leases. 200 Indi-
ans who reside on the reservation on Indian trust land have
strong motivations to preserve threatened or endangered spe-
195. See Ruhl, supra note 179, at 1137 (remarking that the FWS and
NMFS have "led the charge for a more 'ecosystem minded' ESA implementa-
tion").
196. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b); see also S. REP. No. 93-307, at 2 (1973)
(asserting the need to maintain a "balance of nature" within environments
and to preserve biodiversity).
197. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Management, 81 MINN. L. REv. 869, 877-79, 974-75 (1997) (observing that sci-
ence supports an ecosystem management approach, but concluding that con-
servation efforts should involve both a single-species and ecosystem manage-
ment approach); Babbitt, supra note 1, at 518 (referring to the ESA as one of
two laws in this country that provide legal support for promoting biodiver-
sity); Richard J. Blaustein, Convention on Biodiversity Draws Attacks, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 28, 1996, at C39 (discussing elements of the CBD Treaty and the
Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992).
198. See S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 2 (1973).
199. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND
RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 129 (1987) (cautioning that
clearcutting "can cause serious erosion" and that selective cutting can have
long-term impact on the soil, wildlife, and an ecosystem); James A. Leach, Too
Many Trees Are Falling, N.Y. TIMES, November 19, 1997, at A31 (asserting
that logging in national forests "worsens soil erosion, lake and stream sedi-
mentation, and air and water quality," jeopardizing the nation's habitats); see
also Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 439 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
Forest Service's even-aged management practices violated the ESA).
200. See Leach, supra note 199, at A31 (noting that less than four percent
of wood products in the United States come from public lands).
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cies. Not only are these species an important part of a tribe's
culture and spirituality, they are also sometimes vital to sur-
vival.201 Many Indian tribes place great value on the preserva-
tion and protection of resources for future generations.202
Given tribal beliefs and the limited resources on Indian reser-
vations, tribes are more motivated to protect habitat and rep-
resent a smaller threat to threatened and endangered species
than do many non-Indian activities.
Tribes are also motivated to protect threatened and en-
dangered species as a means of averting non-Indian interfer-
ence in tribal affairs. Tribal sovereignty interests can only be
preserved through successful critical habitat management
through an ecosystem approach. Operating cooperatively with
federal agencies, tribes could be protected from outside inter-
ference and spend resources on habitat management rather
than litigious challenges to sovereignty.
3. Federal Policy Supports Allowing Tribes Greater Control
over Critical Habitat Management on Indian Lands
Federal policy increasingly indicates that Indian tribes
and tribal communities should be treated as sovereigns on a
government-to-government basis.203 In addition, tribal self-
201. Some Native Alaskan villages are so dependent upon fishing and
hunting for subsistence that their need was written into an exemption in the
ESA_ See supra note 176 and accompanying text. For those tribes that do not
have any gaming operations, careful resource management may sometimes be
the only option for economic development.
202. See, e.g., CONST. AND BY-LAWS OF THE WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE
TRIBE OF THE FORT APACHE INDIAN RESERVATION ARIZONA preamble (stating
that one of the purposes for forming a tribal government was to "conserve and
develop our tribal lands and resources for ourselves and our children"); Wi-
nona LaDuke, A Seventh Generation Amendment 3-4 (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the author) (reflecting on the Iroquois Confederacy's phi-
losophy "[that we must consider the impact of a decision made today on the
impact on the Seventh Generation from now").
203. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, §§ 4-6 (discussing the importance
of the "government-to-government relationship with the Indian tribes" and
the policies implemented to support the relationship). However, this federal
policy of treating Indian tribes on a government-to-government basis, as well
as Justice John Marshall's legacy, has escaped the jurisprudence of the
Rehnquist Court. See, e.g., Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't,
118 S. Ct. 948 (1998) (declaring that Alaskan Native lands are not "Indian
country," thus denying the tribal government the authority to tax business
activities conducted on its land); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S.
Ct. 789 (1998) (holding that the reservation had been diminished to prevent
the Yankton Sioux tribe from exercising environmental regulatory authority
over hazardous waste sites on the reservation); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
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determination and self-governance are greatly encouraged.
2°4
Allowing tribes greater control over critical habitat manage-
ment furthers the federal policy of self-government. More im-
portantly, dealing with tribes on a government-to-government
basis respects their inherent sovereignty. Some tribes have al-
ready developed successful and respected habitat management
regimes.205 Data collection and trust between tribes and fed-
eral officials have contributed greatly to that success. 20 6 The
Order encourages that process and goes farther in creating
mechanisms for other tribes to improve or create their own
habitat management plans by promoting respect between fed-
eral agencies and tribes and providing the framework for data
and resource sharing.207
Granting additional authority to tribes would not violate
the ESA or the Dion decision. As a matter of respecting tribal
sovereignty, tribal councils should be permitted to design and
execute resource management plans to preserve and protect
critical habitat. The Order takes significant steps toward
granting tribal councils habitat management authority without
removing tribes from ultimate liability under the Act.208 The
Order only applies to tribes or tribal communities, not to indi-
U.S. 438 (1997) (denying a tribal court the power to maintain jurisdiction over
an automobile accident occurring between two non-Indians on a state highway
located on the reservation, despite statutory language defining "Indian coun-
try" to include rights-of-way). While Justice Marshall had his "Trilogy," see
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823),
the Rehnquist Court has managed to produce an "Unholy Trinity," manifested
in the separate persons of Justices Thomas, O'Connor, and Ginsburg.
204. Promoting tribal self-determination is one of the primary policy goals
of the Order. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, app. § 2(A).
205. See DAN SIEMANN, OVERCOMING CONFLICTS WITH THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: BUILDING TRIBAL ENDANGERED SPECIES MANAGEMENT CA-
PACITY 4-5 (1995) (acknowledging the strong listed species management ca-
pacity and assembled expertise of the Yakima, Navajo, and Salish and Koo-
tenai Tribes).
206. These Tribes, in compiling data on species located within the reserva-
tion's boundaries, are more aware of how projected activities will affect habi-
tat. See id. In planning timber sales and other development with listed spe-
cies in mind, these Tribes have established themselves as responsible
managers of critical habitat. See id. at 5. Withholding information from fed-
eral officials in order to protect tribal development has been a common prac-
tice, yet has created some mistrust between tribal and federal officials. See
id at 4.
207. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 5, Principle 5.
208. See id. § 2(B)-(D).
5591998]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
vidual Indians.2 9 Such individuals are still subject to the ESA
and to prosecution. 210 In fact, the Dion test is not implicated
because the Order does not even address the issue of hunting
or fishing rights, but merely the role of tribes in managing
habitat. Therefore, the Order reflects not only federal policy,
but federal law as well.
4. Ramifications of the Order
In addition to the legal and policy reasons for treating
tribes as states under the Order, the likely practical ramifica-
tions of the Order also favor such an arrangement. In re-
stricting the application of the Order to "Indian lands"2 11 and
deferring to tribal authority in the management of critical
habitat,212 the Order creates some potential problems for tribes.
By choosing not to use the term "Indian country"2 13 in defining
the scope of the Order, the Secretaries placed severe limits
upon tribal authority within the reservation.214 Although some
reservations consist of almost exclusively "Indian lands," oth-
ers are heavily fragmented as the result of allotment.215 Lim-
209. See id. §§ 1-2, 5.
210. Although they may be members of a tribe, as Indians individually ex-
ercise their rights, they are individually liable. See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe, Inc.
v. Washington Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165, 171 (1977) (citing Puyallup v.
Washington Game Dep't, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1967)).
211. See supra note 127.
212. See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 5, Principle 3(B).
213. See supra note 127 (distinguishing "Indian Lands" from "Indian coun-
try").
214. Presently, a tribe may not exercise civil jurisdiction over non-
members within the reservation unless one of the two narrow Montana excep-
tions are met. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981)(assuring that a tribe may still exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers who
enter into consensual relationships, such as contracts or leases with members,
or if the conduct of the nonmember has a negative and direct effect "on the
political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare'of the tribe"). The
Court added that regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of a tribe
on lands no longer owned by the tribe did not bear a significantly close rela-
tionship to tribal self-government. See id. at 564. Without the restrictive
"Indian lands" language in place, a tribe might have at least attempted to ar-
gue that nonmember activities within the reservation that adversely affected
habitat enjoyed by candidate, proposed, or listed species had an adverse effect
on the tribe's economic security or health and welfare, thus bringing the mat-
ter under the second Montana exception. By being restricted to exercising
habitat management authority over only tribal trust lands, tribal officials
must rely upon federal agencies to address concerns on fee land within the
reservation.
215. The allotment process was designed to break up the reservation sys-
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iting the application of the Order to "Indian lands" prevents
tribes from regulating activities on nonmember fee land that
may adversely affect critical habitat. In such cases, tribes are
dependent upon the Interior or Commerce Departments to take
action against non-Indian parties who may be violating the
ESA. Considering the overwhelming task facing federal agen-
cies of enforcing the ESA off reservations,216 it seems likely that
Indian tribes will be in a vulnerable position and virtually on
their own to protect their resources.
While the Order may present some difficulties, it also pre-
sents some positive possibilities. A benefit of granting tribes
greater control over information may lie in tribal development
of more cooperative and trusting relationships with main-
stream environmentalists. Rather than challenging tribes in
court, it may be better for environmental groups to meet with
tribes at the bargaining table. In working collectively and co-
operatively with Indian tribes, environmentalists may find an-
other ally in the joint effort to protect dwindling resources and
vanishing species.217 Moreover, environmental organizations,
in developing cooperative relationships with tribes, might be
able to share in the expertise and resources that many tribes
possess.218 Respecting and recognizing tribal expertise and
sovereignty could go a long way in promoting shared conserva-
tionist goals. The alternative for environmental groups is to
increase litigation against tribes and to create a foe where they
would otherwise find a friend. Considering the history of ani-
mosity between tribes and environmental groups, this aspect of
the Order may be one of its greater hidden benefits.
tern and communal village life and replace it with a European-American sys-
tem of individual land ownership. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 74, at 148-
50. A tribe's ability to exercise sovereignty within its borders will often reflect
the Court's analysis of the demographics of the reservation. See, e.g., O1-
iphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (declining to allow an
Indian tribe to exercise criminal authority over a non-Indian, even though
crime was committed against tribal member within the reservation).
216. See supra notes 49, 189 (discussing the inability of the FWS and
NFMS to fulfill their statutory responsibilities due to the enormity of the
task).
217. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the threat of ex-
tinction currently facing various species of trees and other plants).
218. Given the inherent mistrust that tribes often have for environmental
organizations, this road may be a long and difficult one to travel. As with fed-
eral agencies like the BIA, who share a long and dark history with Indian
tribes, environmental groups will have to work diligently to earn the trust of
Indian tribes if they choose to become partners in the preservation of listed
species.
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There is significant legal support for the Interior and
Commerce Secretaries to issue an interpretive order. Other
federal statutes allow tribes to be treated as states to assist in
administration of environmental regulations. Federal policy
seeks to promote greater tribal self-determination and tribes
have a sovereign interest in successfully managing critical
habitat. Moreover, there are many similarities in the language
of the Order and the language in the ESA regarding state
management of critical habitat. Unfortunately, the Order does
not provide the necessary legal foundation on its own. The Or-
der also presents other difficulties that tribes will need to ad-
dress, but also opens up other possibilities. Only an interpre-
tive order can provide tribes the legal protection they need to
develop successful habitat management plans. The Interior
and Commerce Secretaries would be well within their author-
ity to issue such an order.
B. MOVING BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TowARDs
PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE
Since the Order did not create new law or resolve any prior
disputes, perhaps it is more useful to evaluate the Order based
on what it accomplished beyond its legal standards. Rather
than viewing the legal issues in a zero-sum game approach, the
Order begins a process geared toward building stronger rela-
tionships between Indian tribes and the federal government.
First, the Order takes an important and sorely needed step
of creating or improving dialogue between tribes and the fed-
eral government. As noted in the White Mountain Apache ex-
ample, past mistrust between the Tribe and the federal gov-
ernment led tribal officials to withhold information from the
FWS regarding threatened and endangered species on the res-
ervation. 2 9 In the long run, creating a system which fosters
trust instead of animosity between tribes and the federal gov-
ernment will be far more beneficial to threatened and endan-
gered species on Indian lands than any legally binding prece-
dent or amendment from Congress.
In addition, this dialogue could potentially do more than
develop trust between tribes and federal officials. It could set
the standard for a new way of viewing federal-tribal relation-
ships-one closer to the traditional diplomatic model of sover-
219. See supra note 206.
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eign-sovereign relationships. 220 Resolving disputes between
Indian tribes has become so habitually litigious in nature that
the diplomatic approach is rarely viewed as the first option.
The Order and the negotiations leading to it provide a frame-
work in which diplomatic dialogue can not only be the first op-
tion, but often the best.
Second, the Order offers the opportunity for tribes and fed-
eral agencies to move beyond the traditional notions of sover-
eignty and build systems of shared power. Rather than view-
ing the federal government as the superior and administering
agency, the Order attempts to place tribes and federal officials
on an equal level with regard to critical habitat. While still
maintaining a supervisory position and full enforcing power
over the ESA, federal agencies are encouraged to share that
power with Indian tribes and solicit their assistance in admin-
istering the ESA. Rather than recognizing a tribe's authority
based on its land base, the Order allows each tribe to be
treated equally relative to other tribes.221 This notion of an
equal sovereignty among tribes has escaped Indian law juris-
prudence for most of its history.22 2 Certainly not all tribes at
the outset will have the experience and expertise of such tribes
as the Yakima and the Salish,223 but the Order at least creates
the opportunity for tribes to develop such expertise.224 Once
tribes are in a better position to manage their own habitat,
they will be more able to share in this administrative power
with federal agencies.
Finally, the Order establishes what could be a successful
model for future dealings between Indian tribes and the federal
government.225 Certainly, the model will not work in all situa-
220. For example, if the United States government wished to resolve a dis-
pute with a foreign government over treaty stipulations, federal officials of the
State Department, not the Justice Department, would most likely begin the
dialogue.
221. This will not be the case, however, for those tribes with reservations
that hold a relatively small percentage of tribal trust land. These tribes will
continue to be more vulnerable and susceptible to the effects of habitat modi-
fication on listed species.
222. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing the result in
the Oliphant case). Compare the success of the Suquamish Tribe with that of
the Navajo Nation, a relatively intact and "sophisticated" tribal entity. See
Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
223. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
224 See Sec. Order 3206, supra note 14, § 5, Principle 3.
225. See Wilkinson, supra note 102, at 1086-88 (suggesting that although
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tions due to the diverse and complicated nature of the Indian
communities in the United States. The model may also not be
useful in all areas of controversy. The negotiations leading to
the Order illustrate a process that goes beyond the standard
practice in resolving disputes between federal law and Indian
treaty rights. The negotiation process utilized in creating this
Order demonstrates how high-level, person-to-person contact
between tribes and federal agencies can make progress beyond
what twenty years of environmentally-related litigation has
done to exacerbate the persistent problems in the tribal-federal
relationship.
CONCLUSION
In enacting the ESA, Congress stressed the goal of pro-
tecting ecosystems as a means of preserving threatened and
endangered species. Congress charged the Interior and Com-
merce Departments with administering the ESA, giving them
wide deference to seek the help of states, governments, and
agencies in promoting the goal of listed species' conservation.
Through the years, however, this has proven to be a daunting
task. By eliciting the assistance of Indian tribes in achieving
these goals, the Secretaries acted well within their congres-
sional mandate. In addition, the Secretaries, in enacting the
Order, have furthered the federal government's goals of pro-
moting tribal self-determination and respecting tribal sover-
eignty. Moreover, since the ESA did not abrogate Indian treaty
rights, the Order diminishes the likelihood of further interfer-
ences with tribal sovereignty and recognizes the supremacy of
Indian treaties. In accomplishing these goals, the Secretaries
did not diminish the power of the ESA, but created a greater
opportunity for promoting ecosystem management and pro-
tecting and preserving threatened and endangered species. A
tribal ecosystem management approach honors the plain lan-
guage, intent, and purpose of the ESA.
the approach employed in creating the Order might be useful in other areas of
federal Indian law, "[s]trong headwinds will have to be faced" if such an ap-
proach is to be sought in the future).
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